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Schelberg: Illinois Brick and Consumer Actions: The Passing Over of the Pass

ILLINOIS BRICK AND CONSUMER ACTIONS:
THE PASSING OVER OF THE
PASSING-ON DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has frequently construed Congress' intent
in enacting the antitrust laws in favor of a policy of broad
enforcement.' Indeed, the Court has asserted that "[e]very violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system
envisaged by Congress." 2 In effectuating this policy of enforcement, Congress has promulgated a seemingly broad statute. Section 4 of the Clayton Act3 (section 4) provides: "Any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
The language of this statute is sufficiently comprehensive to
achieve its dual goal of (1) compensation to victims of antitrust
violations and (2) deterrence of future violations. 4 The Court has
1. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
130-31 (1969); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(1968); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 318 (1965); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957);
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946).
One commentator has noted the argument that the purpose of the antitrust laws

is to increase consumer wealth. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Consumer Interest,
15 ANTITRUST BULL. 361, 361 n.3 (1970) (citing Bork, The Rule of Reason and the

Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965)).
This argument may be an overstatement, because it announces a result rather than
expresses the congressional intent. However, to the extent that a price-fixing conspiracy results in an inflated price to the consumer either directly, for example, when
the consumer purchases from the manufacturer, or indirectly, for example, when the
consumer purchases through one or more middlemen, a greater expense is incurred.
By effective enforcement of the antitrust laws, the theory is that there will be a
concomitant promotion of competition which will result in lower prices. See generally Comment, Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept of Parens Patriae Suits for
Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 570, 571 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, 43 S. CAL. L. REV.].

2. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). See also Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
4. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2075 (1977). In discussing
these dual policies underlying § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (§ 4), the
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noted that "[t]he statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. . . The Act
is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are
made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
perpetrated." 5
Section 4, however, does not entitle all classes of persons

harmed by violation of the antitrust laws to recover damages. The
statutory language itself imposes limitation by requiring that a
person be "injured in his business or property" and that the damages occur as a result "of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws." 6 But given the objectives of the statute and the policies it
seeks to implement, "the constant tendency of the courts is to find
some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has
7
been done."
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,8 however,
has construed section 4 to mean that "the overcharged direct
purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party 'injured in his business or property.' "9 By so
holding, the Court has effectively removed from the purview of
section 4 an entire class of consumers who do not purchase directly
from the manufacturer. 10
Court quoted the familiar language of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968): "But § 4 has another purpose in addition to deterring violators and depriving them of 'the fruits of their illegality' . . . . [I]t
is also

designed to compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries." Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2081 (1977).
5. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
236 (1948) (citation omitted).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
7. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946) (quoting
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 565 (1931)).
8. 97 S.Ct. 2061 (1977).
9. Id. at 2066.
10. Consumers may be classified into three categories: (1) immediate consumers or direct purchasers who normally act as middlemen, reselling either the same
goods or a refined product to another consumer, see, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 831 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 281
F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960) (immediate purchaser of shoe
machinery); (2) final consumers who obtain goods from the manufacturer or from a
subsequent consumer in the same condition as originally made by the manufacturer,
see, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (direct purchaser of drugs); (3) ultimate consumers or indirect purchasers who obtain a finished product from a middleman who has altered
the goods received from the manufacturer, see, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564, 566-67 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834
(1963) (ultimate consumers of electricity). Illinois asserted that this classification
scheme should be applied in Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., Inc., 67 F.R.D. 461 (N.D.
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The impact of this decision is far-reaching. It establishes a rule
whereby direct purchasers who have not suffered any injury because they have "passed-on" the illegal overcharge to their customers, that is, indirect consumers,1 1 can recover. At the same time,
the Court has denied a remedy to the persons who in many instances bear the "brunt of the antitrust injuries." 1 2 This inequitable
situation, which often presents a direct purchaser with a windfall
profit,' 3 was defended by the Court on policy grounds' 4 and on
Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977) (adopted from Comment, Mangano and UltimateConsumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 394,
396 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 72 COLUM. L. REV.].

The distinction among the three classes is useful in determining consumer
standing issues. See notes 60 & 61 infra and accompanying text. However, because the
Court in Illinois Brick did "not address the standing issue," Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2066 n.7 (1977), the analysis of the various classes of consumers insofar as it relates to standing will not be adopted in this note.
11. The amount of overcharge that can be passed-on to a direct purchaser is a
function of the relative elasticity or inelasticity of demand in the relevant market. If
the market is perfectly inelastic, the burden of the increase will fall wholly upon the
buyer because the demand for the product will not diminish as a function of increased price. In an elastic market, however, the demand will decrease as the price
of the product is increased. As a result, a direct consumer will either have to absorb
the increased cost or decrease his volume. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES,
ECONoMIc NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 147-49 (1974). Although a direct pur-

chaser will probably never be able to pass on the entire increase, it is equally improbable that he will have to absorb the entire increase. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
97 S. Ct. 2061, 2076-77 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing R. POSNER, supra
at 147-49).
One commentator has asserted that an overcharge imposed by a monopolist or
price-fixer can be characterized as a tax. Consequently, tax incidence theory can be
employed to determine when and to what extent a direct purchaser can transfer the
burden of the overcharge to his own customers by charging a higher price. Schaeffer,
Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 883, 887 (1975).
12. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2076 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The House of Representatives reported:
The economic burden of many antitrust violations is borne in large measure
by the consumer in the form of higher prices for his goods and services.
This is especially true of such common and widespread practices as pricefixing, which usually result in higher prices for the consumer, regardless of
the level in the chain of distribution at which the violation occurs.
H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2573.

13. It has been argued that if a windfall profit is to be realized, it is better that
the innocent purchasers should receive it rather than defendants, the antitrust violators. See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). See generally Comment, 72 COLNIs. L. REv., supra note 10, at 411 n.103.
However, the court in Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), noted: "Were the consumers a proper party in these proceedings, it
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grounds of stare decisis. 15
The Court's decision is irreconcilable with its expressed desire
to maintain the viability of the private antitrust suit as both a deterrent to violations and as an aid to governmental policing of the

antitrust laws. 16 The decision must also be viewed critically in light
of the recent Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of

might be urged by defendants that the Court should equitably distribute the damages between the utilities and the consumers .... ." Id. at 70. Yet the court here
cited a subsequent footnote, footnote 41, in which cases were cited which held that
ultimate consumers of electricity have no standing to sue the electrical equipment
manufacturers. Id. But these cases were all decided in 1962 or 1963; the prevailing
law, as stated in Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1976),
rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977), is that "ultimate
consumers may recover for violations of the Sherman Act." Id. at 1165.
Moreover, in some instances a direct purchaser may actually collude with the
manufacturer and benefit economically from the illegal overcharge. See Note, The
Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-on Doctrine, 46 S. CAL.
L. REv. 98, 112 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, 46 S. CAL. L. REV.]. Thus, to
permit a direct purchaser to recoup his losses, if any, sustained as a result of an
illegal overcharge, and to further permit this class of purchasers to receive a windfall
profit while denying truly injured consumers any form of relief, is a wholly inequitable result which Congress did not intend.
14. The Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977), expressed
two important policy considerations in denying offensive passing-on: (1) the preservation of the effectiveness of the antitrust treble-damage action, id. at 2069; and (2)
the desire to insulate an antitrust violator from being exposed to the risk of multiple
liability, id. at 2067.
15. "In considering whether to cut back or abandon the Hanover Shoe rule, we
must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of
statutory construction where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of
its legislation." Id. at 2070 (citations omitted). However, Mr. Justice Blackmun in
dissent chided the majority for its "wooden approach," asserting that "it is entirely
inadequate when considered in the light of the Sherman and Clayton Acts." Id. at
2085 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 179 infra.
16. In discussing congressional policies in this area, the Court has stated:
It is clear Congress intended to use private self-interest as a means of enforcement and to arm injured persons with private means to retribution
when it gave to any injured party a private cause of action in which his
damages are to be made good threefold, with costs of suit and reasonable
attorney's fee.
Bruce Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947). See also United
States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518-19 (1954): "These private [injunction or treble damage actions under § 4] and public actions [government enforcement] were
designed to be cumulative, not mutually exclusive." Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1964) (citation omitted): "Section 4 of the Clayton Act was designed not only to vindicate private wrongs but to
aid enforcement of the antitrust laws ....
The deterrent effect inherent in private
treble damage actions would be destroyed if the non-liability rule for which defendants contend were recognized." See generally Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 252 (1972). Cf. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694-95 (1948) (Sherman
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1976.' 7 This note will examine the rationales of the majority and
the dissent with particular emphasis on the "passing-on" defense.
The thesis of this note is that the Court has, in its search for consistency, departed from the principles articulated by congressional
legislation and by the Court's prior decisions which have supported
the private treble-damage remedy.
Hanover Shoe AND THE DEFENSIVE

USE OF

THE PASSING-ON DOCTRINE

Hanover Shoe
An analysis of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.18 is fundamental to an understanding of Illinois Brick and of
the doctrine of passing-on. 19 In Hanover Shoe a private trebledamage suit was brought by Hanover Shoe, a manufacturer and distributor of shoes, against United Shoe Machinery Corp. 20 (United),
a manufacturer of machinery needed for the manufacture of shoes.
The complaint alleged that United had engaged in an unlawful
monopolization of the shoe machinery industry in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 21 In defense, United claimed

Antitrust Act and Trade Commission Act provide government with cumulative remedies).
17. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)).
18. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
19. The importance of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392
U.S. 481 (1968), is evident from the treatment given the case in the Court's opinion
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977). Indeed, Mr. Justice White set
out both the facts and law of Hanover Shoe before mentioning the facts of Illinois
Brick. See id. at 2062-65.
20. Suit was filed in 1955 in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 483 (1968).
21. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), provides in
pertinent part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Treble damages were also sought pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970). See text accompanying note 3 supra. The Court in Hanover Shoe also applied
§ 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970), which provides that "[a] final
judgment or decree .. .in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf
of the United States under the antitrust laws ... shall be prima facie evidence ... as
to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as
between the parties thereto." Pursuant to this section, Hanover Shoe asserted that
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that "the plaintiff [Hanover] had not been injured in its business as
required by § 4 because it had passed on the claimed illegal overcharge to those who bought shoes from it."2 2 By contending that
the proper party to sue was not the direct purchaser but rather the
indirect purchaser, the defendant asserted, in effect, that the direct
purchaser had suffered no legal injury for which it could recover
under the antitrust laws. 2 3 That is, "[t]he illegal overcharge was
24
absorbed by the plaintiff's customers."
The Court rejected the proffered defense2 5 as a matter of law
subject to certain limited exceptions. 2 6 Mr. Justice White writing
for the majority flatly denounced the passing-on defense:
the judgment in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), was prima facie evidence of
United's antitrust violation. Hanover Shoe was awarded $4,239,609, including interest, as well as $650,000 in counsel fees in its treble-damage suit against United.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the finding of liability but disagreed with the district court's findings as to certain questions respecting damages.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967). Both
parties sought review by the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted to both
petitioners. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 389 U.S. 818 (1967).
The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 504 (1968).
22. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2064 (1977).
23. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-88
(1968).
24. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2064 (1977).
25. Prior to Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968), the only Supreme Court decision to deal with passing-on in an antitrust context was Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
26. The Court in Hanover Shoe recognized two exceptions; however, the exception pertinent to discussion here is the preexisting cost-plus contract. (The other
exception was price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1970)). The Court's rationale in carving out these
exceptions was that in either of these two situations, the problems of proving that a
pass-on had occurred and the problems inherent in the ascertainment of the amount
of the pass-on would not be present. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
A cost-plus contract is one in which the customer agrees to pay for the product
plus a specified profit. If the increased costs are passed on to the direct purchaser's
customer, it is readily apparent that the direct purchaser is not injured. See Pollack,
Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-On Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183, 1188 (1968). See also Note, 46 S. CAL. L. REV.,
supra note 13, at 98, 108. For cases involving cost-plus contracts or analogous fixed
markup arrangements, see Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F.
Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871
(1971); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Oil Co., 56 F. Supp. 569 (D. Minn. 1944),
aff'd, 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
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If in the face of the overcharge the buyer does nothing and
absorbs the loss, he is entitled to treble damages. This much
seems conceded. The reason is that he has paid more than he
should and his property has been illegally diminished, for had
the price paid been lower his profits would have been higher. It
is also clear that if the buyer, responding to the illegal price,
maintains his own price but takes steps to increase his volume or
to decrease other costs, his right to damages is not destroyed.
Though he may manage to maintain his profit level, he would
have made more if his purchases from the defendant had cost
him less. We hold that the buyer is equally entitled to damages
if he raises the price for his own product. As long as the seller
continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer
more than the law allows. At whatever price the buyer sells, the
price he pays the seller remains illegally high, and his profits
27
would be greater were his costs lower.

Judicial Economy
The Court in Hanover Shoe was concerned with the efficacy of
the antitrust suit and the burden on the judicial system that this
complex litigation inevitably causes. Mr. Justice White's reasoning

was based on the questionable assertion that the complexity of
proof needed to prove passing-on would be "insurmountable.-

28

Despite the evidentiary complexities inherent in the passing-on defense, Justice White reasoned that if this defense were available
27. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,489 (1968).
28. Justice white stated:
A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies. Normally the
impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured
after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had
one fact been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic
conditions more buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would
have chosen a different price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real
economic world rather than an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a company's price will have on its total sales. Finally, costs
per unit for a different volume of sales are hard to estimate. Even it if could
be shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount
of, the overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had not thereafter declined, there would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his
prices absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued. Since establishing the applicability of the
passing-on defense would require a convincing showing of each of these
virtually unascertainable figures, the task would normally prove insurmountable.
Id. at 492-93 (footnote omitted).
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"defendants [would] frequently seek to establish its applicability." 29
The strain on the judicial system that would necessarily result
when litigants sought to establish the defense was the ground for
its rejection. The Court hypothesized that civil antitrust trebledamage actions would "often require additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated
theories." 30
In some instances, however, the direct purchaser's burden of
proof in establishing an overcharge would be as difficult to establish as the burden on an antitrust defendant in proving a passingon defense; 31 since in Hanover Shoe the plaintiff was able to meet
his burden of proof on the damages issue without justifying the
majority's fears of judicially overburdensome suits, it seems that
the Court's concern was more hypothetical than real.
Moreover, as one commentator has suggested, 32 by viewing
the overcharge as a tax, economic tax incidence theory3 3 may be
employed to determine "when and to what extent" a direct purchaser can pass-on the overcharge to its customers in the form of
higher prices. 34 Economic tax incidence theory and other statistical
and sampling methods 35 are tools that have been used to prove
passing-on and other complex concepts. 36 Despite these sophisticated techniques for proving and measuring passing-on, there is
29. Id. at 493.
30. Id. Yet such complicated proceedings would not necessarily be caused by
the passing-on defense. "[T]his [inevitable complexity] may be said of almost all
antitrust cases." Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2081 (1977). See also
Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123
U. PA. L. Rv. 976, 983 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 123 U. PA. L. REV.].

For cases in which there were complex proof issues that did not prove insurmountable, see Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954).
31. The task characterized as insurmountable by Mr. Justice White is "generally no more difficult or complex than the plaintiff's [the direct purchaser's] task of
proving an overcharge in the first instance." Pollack, supra note 26, at 1210. A plaintiff (direct purchaser) in a treble-damage antitrust suit normally receives in damages
the difference between what he paid and what he would have paid absent the antitrust violation. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
487 (1968).
32. Schaeffer, supra note 11, at 883, 887.
33. See note 11 supra.
34. Schaeffer, supra note 11, at 887.
35. See BOARD OF EDrroRs OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.712 (1975).
36. See also H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 n.23 (1975), reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2586 (citing cases).
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still little doubt that an antitrust treble-damage suit will necessarily
involve "long and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories." 3 7 Yet the complexity of antitrust
proceedings, especially in light of a trial judge's discretion to bar
highly speculative or conjectural evidence, should not prevent an
antitrust defendant from having an opportunity to rebut on the issues of injury and damages. 38
Providing a ProperParty Plaintiffto
Enforce the Antitrust Laws
The Supreme Court's second rationale in Hanover Shoe for
barring the passing-on defense was the policy of private enforcement of the antitrust laws. 3 9 As the Court asserted:
In addition, if buyers are subjected to the passing-on defense, those who buy from them would also have to meet the
challenge that they passed on the higher price to their customers. These ultimate consumers, in today's case the buyers of
single pairs of shoes, would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit
and little interest in attempting a class action. In consequence,
those who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was
available who would bring suit against them. Treble-damage acemtions, the importance of which the Court has many times
40
phasized, would be substantially reduced in effectiveness.
Although this argument superficially has great appeal, upon
closer scrutiny it fails 4 ' because it neglects to consider economic
42
realities of the business world.
The Court's major concern was that the antitrust defendant
would violate the law with impunity if antitrust enforcement were
37. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 491, 493 (1968).
See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
38. Pollack, supra note 26, at 1212-13. But see Wheeler, Antitrust TrebleDamage Action: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. Rtv. 1319, 1324 (1973) (passing-on
defense involves extensive discovery by both parties and substantially raises
plaintiffs' litigation costs).
39. See also note 1 supra and accompanying text.
40. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
41. It has been argued by one commentator that the two considerations relevant to this argument, that is, the insurmountability of proving a passing-on defense
and the desire to prevent antitrust defendants from retaining the "fruits of their illegality," are inconsistent: "If 'the task would normally prove insurmountable,' then
obviously none of those defendants 'would retain the fruits of their illegality.'" Pollack, supra note 26, at 1208-09.
42. See Wheeler, supra note 38, at 1330-34.
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left to indirect consumers. 43 As a result of this concern, the Court
rejected the passing-on defense as a matter of law. Thus, the Court
implicitly elevated the direct purchaser to the "preferred position" 4 4 for enforcing private antitrust suits. However, a number of
factors militate against a direct purchaser suing the manufacturer
who, it must be remembered, is also the direct purchaser's supplier. This relationship often effectively precludes the direct pur45
chaser from taking any action.
43. It is the indirect purchaser, bearing the financial impact of a price-fixing
conspiracy "who benefits from the proper functioning of our free enterprise system."
H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2577. See text accompanying note 1 supra. As a result of
this tangible loss an indirect purchaser has a greater incentive to sue an antitrust
defendant than a direct purchaser who, in most instances, wants to maintain good
relations with the manufacturer. See also text accompanying note 45 infra. From a
pure deterrence standpoint, it makes no difference who sues and obtains the judgment against the antitrust defendant. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061,
2082 (1977). "Antitrust violators are equally deterred whether the judgments against
them are in favor of direct or indirect purchasers." Id. However, from a compensation point of view, the person actually injured by the overcharge should be the party
who receives the damage award. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
The House committee has asserted that "adequate enforcement mechanisms
simply do not exist" for consumers. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1975),
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2572, 2577. Thus, the House
committee recognized that the indirect purchaser has an interest in bringing suit
against antitrust defendants whose illegal activity causes them to pay an increased
price for the products they purchase. As a result of this consumer need, Congress
devised a procedural mechanism tailored to meet the interests of a large number of
plaintiffs suing in one action. Although the House report noted that indirect purchasers, consumers, usually have the greatest interest in suing an antitrust defendant
because they are subjected to the major impact of the violation, other parties frequently may also have an interest in suing an antitrust defendant:
A single antitrust violation, it must be noted, may cause multiple injuries, and each individual or business which is injured in its business or
property has a right to recover damages. A violation occurring at the retail
level may, in addition to raising consumer prices, injure other retailers who
compete with the violators.
H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 n.8 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2578.
44. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2075 (1977).
45. Professor Wheeler has stated:
During the two years which I worked as one of the myriad plaintiffs' counsel in the plumbing fixture cases [Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub
nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d
1187 (3d Cir. 1971)], I received several calls from members of the various
alleged classes of plaintiffs (consumers, contractors, plumbing contractors,
building-owners, for example) asking about the nature of the litigation and
concluding that the risks to their relationships with their suppliers did not
warrantjoining the fray."
Wheeler, supra note 38, at 1332 n.57 (emphasis added).
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In addition, many direct purchasers are hesitant to sue for
fear of becoming embroiled in protracted litigation"6 involving substantial cash outlays4 7 and expenditures of time and effort.4 8 Furthermore, even if a direct purchaser is willing to risk being cut off
by his supplier and is willing to make the necessary expenditures
of time and money, he must still prove that the violation injured
him49 and must prove the amount of the injury. Inherent in this task
are formidable problems of proof.50 These factors militating against
direct purchasers suing and further complicating the already complex litigation, with the inevitably long delay51 between the date of
injury and the time suit is brought, 52 indicate that the Court's objective of establishing the direct purchaser as the best party to assure the enforcement of the antitrust laws will go unfulfilled.
46.

According to information furnished by the Administrative Office of the U.S.

Courts, the average duration of antitrust cases disposed of since 1964 was 21.5
months; of those terminated in 1969, the average duration was 25.8 months. However, these figures are misleading because only a small percentage of private antitrust cases go to judgment. Of those cases in which there was a judgment, the average duration was 37.4 months for cases disposed of in 1964 and 46.7 months for cases
disposed of in 1969. See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13
J.L. & ECON. 365, 381 (1970).

47. The cost to plaintiff of an antitrust suit will be "an absolute minimum of
$5000 in the smallest of cases and to considerable thousands beyond that in the
larger cases." Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 ABA ANTrrRUST
L.J. 87, 93 (1966). See Wheeler, supra note 38, at 1330-31. In West Virginia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971), notice to all class members alone cost approximately
$130,000. Id. at 724-25.
48. The plumbing fixture litigation, Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom.
Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir.
1971) is
the most massive multidistrict litigation-over 200 separate actions ....
[N]ew actions are being filed almost every day. In the past 90 days, 59 new
actions have been filed and transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. It is of course necessary to integrate such newly filed actions into the
discovery program underway in the transferee court.
In re Plumbing Fixtures, 311 F. Supp. 349, 350 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
50. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
51. Time gaps between the start of the illegal combination and institution of
suit by the government have in some instances run 35 years (powder), 17 years (tobacco), 12 years (shoe machinery), 11 years (glucose), 10 years (steel), 10 years (farm
machinery), and 16 years (anthracite coal). See Comment, Fifty Years of Sherman
Act Enforcement, 49 YALE L.J. 284, 292 n.49 (1939), quoted in Wheeler, supra note
38, at 1339 n.94.
52. During this long time lapse, witnesses may die or otherwise become unavailable, important documents and records may be lost, and witnesses' memories
may dull.
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The Limited Scope of Hanover Shoe
The Court's holding in Hanover Shoe with respect to the
passing-on defense was that Hanover Shoe proved injury and the
amount of its damages within the meaning of section 4 of the

Clayton Act when it showed that United had overcharged during the damage period and when it proved the amount of the
overcharge. 53 In so holding, the Court denied United the oppor-

tunity to assert a passing-on defense. Despite this relatively limited holding, the case has been misinterpreted by various federal
courts.

54

53. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
54. For example, Illinois Brick is instructive in documenting the problems various courts have had in applying the Hanover Shoe decision. The district court in
Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., Inc., 67 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d
1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061
(1977), stated, after an analysis of Hanover Shoe: "This Court does not believe that
in Hanover the Supreme Court intended to foreclose standing to all plaintiffs not
immediate purchasers from alleged antitrust violators." Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
The court later stated: "This Court therefore holds that, as to ultimate consumers,
their injuries are too remote and consequential to provide legal standing to sue
against the alleged antitrust violator." Id. at 468. The Seventh Circuit, on appeal
from the summary judgment motion granted to defendants, Illinois v. Ampress Brick
Co., Inc., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977), stated: "The district court held that plaintiff's interests as
ultimate consumers were not protected by the antitrust laws. We disagree and therefore reverse." Id. at 1165. The court later stated: "To the extent that the district court
held that these plaintiffs, as opposed to ultimate consumers in general, lack standing,
we disagree." Id. at 1167. The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S.
Ct. 2061 (1977), stated in a footnote:
Because we find Hanover Shoe dispostive here, we do not address the
standing issue, except to note . . . that the question of which persons have
been injured by an illegal overcharge for purposes of § 4 is analytically distinct from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too remote
to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4.
Id. at 2066 n.7.
Thus, two federal courts have read Hanover Shoe to involve a standing issue
when in reality the Court in Hanover Shoe never mentioned standing. Mr. Justice
White's opinion did not even address the standing issue in Illinois Brick. Moreover,
Justice White, in note 7, cites Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer
Interests: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J.
626 (1976). This article uses the plumbing fixtures litigation, Philadelphia Hous.
Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d
1187 (3d Cir. 1971) as an illustrative case. The authors state: "However, the disallowance of the homeowner's claim in Plumbing Fixtures had nothing more to do with
standing than did the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the pass-on defense in
Hanover Shoe." Handler & Blechman, supra at 644-45 (footnote omitted).
Even the briefs of counsel reflect confusion as to the meaning of Hanover Shoe.
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Hanover Shoe was not antagonistic to antitrust litigation, nor
did it portend the end of consumer suits. To the contrary, Hanover
Shoe was consistent with a long line of cases 55 that have eased the
burden for private antitrust plaintiffs to bring suit. 56 However, to
understand properly the scope of the Court's decision in Hanover
Shoe, the case must be strictly confined to its peculiar fact situa57
tion.
Hanover Shoe denied a defense which was offered after plaintiffs had put in their proof near the end of a long and complex
antitrust trial. 58 It did not prevent a plaintiff from seeking to prove
Petitioner, Illinois Brick, viewed Hanover Shoe as dealing with problems of proof:
"While the Hanover case posed the issue in terms of rejecting the assertion of the
pass-on defense rather than denying a claim by an indirect purchaser, the result is
the same." Brief for Petitioners at 12, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners]. Respondent, Illinois, on the other
hand, viewed Hanover Shoe as dealing with a standing issue. The thrust of
respondent's argument was that prior to the decision in Hanover Shoe, "the federal
courts consistently ruled that indirect purchasers had standing to sue and could
recover damages for illegal overcharges." Brief for Respondents at 9-10, Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondents]. Hanover Shoe, the respondent then argued, "did not disturb the well-settled
law . . . that indifect purchasers could sue for illegal overcharges." Id. at 13. However, to confuse the issue further, respondent cited a district court case decided after
Hanover Shoe, Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973), arguing that the Supreme Court "nowhere specifically states that Hanover Shoe had
standing because it was in 'privity' with United Shoe or that privity is a requirement
of standing in private antitrust cases." Brief for Respondents, supra at 13. The
United States as amicus curiae viewed Hanover Shoe correctly, that is, as an issue of
proof and not one of standing. "The Court in Hanover held that this defensive use of
a passing-on claim could not be allowed to defeat the plaintiff's right to recovery."
Brief for United States as amicus curiae at 16, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct.
2061 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for United States as amicus curiae]. Thus, an
examination of a single issue in Hanover Shoe, the passing-on defense, demonstrates
that courts and counsel alike have read propositions of law into the case that were
never acknowledged by the Supreme Court even as dicta.
55. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31
(1969); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968);
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318
(1965); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957).
56. See Comment, 123 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 30, at 993.
57. In Hanover Shoe the courts confronted a corporation which maintained a
network of contracts with approximately 90% of all shoe factories. It supplied 75% of
the demand for shoe machinery in the United States. It did so on a leasing basis
which permitted each manufacturer of shoes to approximate the cost of every other
manufacturer using the same machinery. In short, the shoe machinery market was a
controlled market in which a uniformly high price was maintained. United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 297 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954).
58. In addition, there had already been a judgment rendered against defendant
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his damages; 5 9 nor did it erect a privity barrier6 0 as a test for legal
standing 61 to stop antitrust plaintiffs at the courtroom doors. Thus,
in analyzing the breadth of Hanover Shoe, one should remember
the context in which the decision was rendered and the policy the
62
Court was attempting to further.
Illinois Brick

AND THE OFFENSIVE USE OF

THE PASSING-ON DOCTRINE

Illinois Brick

In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,63 the Supreme Court once
again confronted the issue of passing-on; however, this time the
suit was presented in a new context. 64 In 1973, the United States
indicted defendant, Illinois Brick Co.,65 and filed a companion civil
United Shoe Machinery Corporation in a criminal suit brought by the United States.
See id.
59. See, e.g., Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 600 (N.D. I11.
1973) (problems of proof). Cf. Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72
(D.N.J. 1971) (problems of distribution of damages).
60. Compare In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th
Cir. 1973) with South Carolina Council of Milk Prods., Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414,
417-18 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966) and Denver v. American Oil Co.,
53 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Colo. 1971).
61. For cases in which standing was denied, see Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970) (franchiser); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963) (supplier); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 276 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
aff'd, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969) (licensor); Snow Crest
Beverages v. Recipe Food, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956) (supplier). For
cases in which standing was afforded, see South Carolina Council of Milk Prods.,
Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966) (supplier);
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955) (supplier); Schroeter v. Ralph Wilson Plastics, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (shareholder and
employee).
62. "In its rejection of passing-on defense, Hanover Shoe's basic aim was to
protect the treble-damage remedy." Comment, 123 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 30, at
993.
63. 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977).
64. Mr. Justice White framed the issue:
In this case we once again confront the question whether the overcharged direct purchaser should be deemed for purposes of § 4 to have suffered the full injury from the overcharge; but the issue is presented in the
context of a suit in which the plaintiff, an indirect purchaser, seeks to show
its injury by establishing pass-on by the direct purchaser and in which the
antitrust defendants rely on Hanover Shoe's rejection of the pass-on theory.
Id. at 2065.
65. In 1973, an indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. See Brief for United States as amicus curiae,supra note
54, at 3 n.2.
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action charging that Illinois Brick Co. had violated section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act 66 in that it had conspired to restrain trade
by unlawfully fixing the price 6 7 of concrete blocks. Pleas of nolo
contendere were accepted in the criminal case and a consent
decree6 8 was entered in the civil suit. 69 Simultaneously with the
filing of the government suit, private treble-damage actions were
filed by masonry contractors, general contractors, private builders,
and the State of Illinois for itself and for various governmental en70
tities in the greater Chicago area.
The governmental plaintiffs asserted that defendant, a concrete
block manufacturer, had sold large quantities of its product to
masonry and general contractors. These concrete blocks were then
incorporated into buildings and structures which were purchased
by the State of Illinois and other governmental entities. The plaintiffs further asserted that they had paid an inflated price for these
buildings and structures because the manufacturers of the concrete
blocks had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy; moreover, they as66. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). This section provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of

trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal .... Id.
67. Generally, "[tihe object of a price-fixing agreement ... is not to exclude
competitors. Rather, the object is to raise prices for the benefit of all ostensible competitors who participate in the agreement, and to inflict the overcharge on immediate
purchasers and on their customers if the overcharge is passed on." Carnivale Bag
Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
68. A consent decree is:
(olne entered by consent of the parties: it is not properly a judicial sentence,
but is in the nature of a solemn contract or agreement of the parties, made
under the sanction of the court, and in effect an admission by them that the
decree is a just determination of their rights upon the real facts of the case,
if such facts had been proved.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 499 (4th rev. ed. 1968) (citations omitted).

69. Potential civil litigants in treble-damage actions filed after the plea of nolo
contendere and the consent judgment had been entered could not invoke 15 U.S.C.
§ 16 (a) (Supp. V 1975), to use the prior criminal or civil proceedings as prima facie
evidence of their claims, see text accompanying note 21 supra, because § 16(a) specifically excludes from its purview "consent judgments or decrees entered before any
testimony has been taken or ...judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 15a of this title." 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (Supp. V 1975). This exclusion covers pleas
of nolo contendere, as well as consent judgments, because a plea of nolo contendere
is not a final judgment or decree under § 16(a). See Pfotzer v. Aqua Syss., Inc., 162
F.2d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1947); Simco Sales Serv., Inc. v. Air Reduction Co., Inc., 213
F. Supp. 505, 506-07 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
70. All of these actions except that brought by the State of Illinois were settled
with the payment of agreed sums of money without prejudice to Illinois's suit. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S.Ct. 2061 (1977).
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serted that increased cost was passed 71
on to them through the intervening links in the distribution chain.
The language of plaintiffs' complaint reflected these factual allegations: "By reason of defendants' illegal conduct such plaintiffs
[various governmental entities] were compelled to pay and have
paid substantially higher prices for such concrete blocks than they
would have paid had defendants' combination and conspiracy not
existed or occurred." 72 The complaint further alleged that the cost
of the buildings was $3 million higher because of this price-fixing
73
conspiracy.
Defendant manufacturers moved for partial summary judgment against all plaintiffs who were not direct purchasers of concrete blocks. 74 They contended that as a matter of law, only direct
purchasers of concrete blocks have standing to sue the manufacturers for alleged violation of the antitrust laws. 7 5 The district court,
citing Hanover Shoe and other cases which have construed Hanover Shoe, 76 saw the issue solely as one of standing and granted de77
fendants' motion.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
lower court, holding that ultimate consumers may recover treble71.

Id.

72.
73.

Brief for Respondents, supra note 54, at 2 (quoting Joint App. 12).
See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2065 (1977).

74. The district court described these indirect purchasers: "The remaining responding plaintiffs did not purchase concrete block directly from any defendant, nor
did they purchase concrete block indirectly pursuant to a cost-plus contract. What
these plaintiffs purchased were buildings: a package of goods and services of which
concrete block was one component part." Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D.
461, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub non.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977).
75. Id.
76. Judge Kirkland, after stating the holding of Hanover Shoe that "the trial
court's refusal to hear evidence that the direct purchaser plaintiff had 'passed-on'
alleged illegal overcharges to its customers was not error," id. at 464, then noted
that two divergent lines of authorities have interpreted Hanover Shoe. Id. Judge
Kirkland's opinion, especially in light of the cases he cited, indicated that the more
acceptable reading of Hanover Shoe limited recovery to the initial or first purchaser
in the chain of distribution. Id. Despite the numerous authorities to the contrary,
both the district court, see id. at 466, and the Seventh Circuit, see Illinois v. Ampress
Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977), adopted the minority view that indirect purchasers could prove
their damages. See text accompanying note 80 infra.
77. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 464-68 (N.D. Ill.
1975),
rev'd, 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97
S. Ct. 2061 (1977). Defendants had served interrogatories on plaintiffs, The answers
to these interrogatories indicated that only 48 of the more than 700 plaintiffs even
knew the costs of the concrete block. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 54, at 5 n.**.
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damages for an illegal overcharge if they can prove the increase
was passed-on to them. 78 Thus, the Seventh Circuit, in deciding
that indirect purchasers could sue for overcharges passed on to
them through the intervening links in the chain of distribution,
decided two distinct issues: (1) that indirect purchasers have standing to sue;79 and (2) that Hanover Shoe means that indirect consumers are not foreclosed from the attempt to prove their damages. 0
The Majority's Approach: The "EqualApplication" Argument
Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, stated:
[W]e conclude that whatever rule is to be adopted regarding
pass-on in antitrust damage actions, it must apply equally to
plaintiffs and defendants. Because Hanover Shoe would bar
petitioners [Illinois Brick Co.] from using respondent's [Illinois's]
pass-on theory as a defense to a treble-damage suit by the direct
purchasers (the masonry contractors), we are faced with the
choice of overruling (or narrowly limiting) Hanover Shoe or of
applying it to bar respondents' attempt to use this pass-on theory
offensively. 8 '
The Court declined to abandon its construction of section 4 in
Hanover Shoe that only direct purchasers and not others in the
distribution chain constitute the party injured in his business or
property, in the absence of "convincing demonstration that the
Court was wrong in Hanover Shoe to think that the effectiveness of
the antitrust treble-damage action would be substantially reduced
by adopting a rule that any party in the chain may sue to recover
the fraction of the overcharge allegedly absorbed by it."82 Thus,
the majority expressed an intention to promote enforcement of the
antitrust laws. However, the Court's assumption that this policy of
effective enforcement would be substantially furthered rather than
hindered by barring the passing-on doctrine both as a defensive
78. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1165-67 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd
sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977).
79. Id. at 1165. This standing question was the narrow issue that was appealed
by the plaintiffs; on this issue, the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court.
80. Id. at 1165-67. The district court and court of appeals did not disagree as to
the damages issue. Both courts read Hanover Shoe to allow indirect purchasers an
opportunity to prove their damages. On this point, the Supreme Court disagreed,
reversing the lower courts. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2065-66
& 2066 n.7 (1977).
81. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2066 (1977). Cf. text accompanying notes 88 & 89 infra (limiting HanoverShoe bar to situations in which direct
and indirect purchasers are not parties in same action).
82. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2066 (1977).
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shield and as an offensive weapon is questionable. At this juncture,
it is sufficient to note that the Court had not lost sight of the dual
objectives-compensation and deterrence 8 3 -of the antitrust laws.
But the Court attempted to balance these two objectives, with the
deterrence goal reigning supreme. 84 Had the Court been more
farsighted, the majority would have seen, as did the dissent, "the
clear directions from Congress" in the form of the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.85
83. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
84. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2075 (1977).
85. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383. See text accompanying note 17 supra and
text accompanying notes 162-177 infra. The majority attempted to sidestep the evident legislative intent of the Act. Mr. Justice White pointed to the legislation's remedial nature and noted that the Act does not alter the meaning of § 4; the Court
quoted the House report, H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2578:
[T]he parens patriae provision 'creates no new substantive liability'; the relevant language of the newly enacted § 4C(a) of the Clayton Act tracks that
of existing § 4, showing that it was intended only as 'an alternative means
• . . for the vindication of existing substantive claims' . . . . 'The establishment of an alternative remedy does not increase any defendant's liability.'
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2068 n.14 (1977) (citation omitted). However, the relevant language omitted by Mr. Justice White indicates that Congress in-

tended that both direct and indirect purchasers were already included within § 4:
"Each person on whose behalf the State attorney general is empowered to sue already
has his own cause of action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, even if, for practical
reasons, the right to sue is not likely to be exercised." H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2578.
(emphasis added).
Thus, viewed in this context, the intent demonstrated by the House report,
that the legislation establishes an "alternative remedy" and that the legislation
"does not increase any defendant's liability," id., [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 2579, indicates that Congress intended § 4 to cover indirect purchasers; Congress was
merely increasing "[tihe likelihood of a financial recovery against an antitrust violator," id., by creating this remedy. Viewed in any other way, the intent expressed
in the House report makes little practical sense. One wonders why Congress would
have created a remedy "where none had existed before" if the only person who could
profit from such remedy were not covered by the Act which the remedy was created
to effectuate.
Further evidence of congressional intent may be gleaned from California v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). In
Frito-Lay California sued on behalf of 20 million purchasers of snack foods alleging
that they had been overcharged by virtue of a price-fixing conspiracy. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California could not maintain such a parens
patriae action for its injured and legally helpless citizens. The court acknowledged
the state's "imaginative" approach, but stated:
If the State is to be empowered to act in the fashion here sought we feel
that authority must come not through judicial improvisation but by legislation and rule making, where careful consideration can be given to the conditions and procedures that will suffice to meet the many problems posed by
one's assertion of power to deal with another's property and to commit him
to actions taken in his behalf.
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The Dissenter'sApproach:
The "Unequal Application" Argument
Mr. Justice Brennan dissented, despite what he termed the
superficial appeal" of the majority's "equal application" argument.8 6 "The interests at stake in the 'offensive' passing-on cases,
where the indirect purchasers sue for damages for their injuries,
are simply not the same as the interests at stake in the Hanover
Shoe, or 'defensive passing-on' situation."8 7 The dissent argued
that the Hanover Shoe bar to the passing-on defense should only
be allowed where direct and indirect purchasers are not parties
in the same action. 8 8 Mr. Justice Brennan, in singling out the situation in which only one action by either of the two purchasers
is brought against the antitrust defendant, reasoned that this was
the only possible situation in which an antitrust defendant might
escape liability. 8 9 As a consequence, the dissenting Justice asserted
that the effectiveness of the treble-damage action would be severely weakened.
Justice Brennan's "unequal application" argument was rooted
in the decision of Judge Blumfeld in In re Master Key Antitrust
Litigation.9 In that case, consolidated under the multidistrict procedures for pretrial proceedings, 91 indirect governmental purchasers, as well as direct purchasers, had sued manufacturers of hardware for unlawful conspiracy to fix the prices of their products .92
The defendants moved for summary judgment against the indirect
purchasers. The Connecticut district court denied the defendants'
Id. at 777. The House bill which matured into the new Act, H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976), was "a response to the judicial invitation extended in Frito-Lay. The

thrust of the bill [was] to overturn Frito-Lay by allowing state attorneys general to
act as consumer advocates in the enforcement process, while at the same time avoiding the problems of manageability which some courts have found under Rule 23."
H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2578.

86. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2078-79 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id.

88. Id.
89. Mr. Justice Brennan reasoned that if an antitrust defendant were permitted
to invoke the pass-on defense against a direct purchaser-plaintiff, for example, then
absent a suit by an indirect purchaser, who might not sue because he lacks the funds
to bring the action or because he is fearful of problems that may arise in ascertaining
his damages, the antitrust defendant would escape liability and subvert the deterrence policy that underlies the antitrust laws. Id.
90. [1973-2] Trade Cases 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
92. All defendants brought suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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motion for summary judgment. 9 3 Mr. Justice Brennan adopted the
Connecticut district court's language in his dissenting opinion in
Illinois Brick: "The attempt to transform a rejection of a defense
because it unduly hampers antitrust enforcement into a reason for
a complete refusal to entertain the claims of a certain class of plaintiffs seems an ingenious attempt to turn the decision [in Hanover
94
Shoe] and its underlying rationale on its head."
THE POLICY ARGUMENTS

Multiple Liability
The majority argued that permitting offensive passing-on while
barring defensive passing-on would "create a serious risk of multiple liability for defendants." 9 5 Notwithstanding that at least one
commentator 96 as well as some courts97 have argued that this risk
is merely hypothetical and illusory, there are a number of procedural devices that greatly reduce the likelihood of this occurrence. Before examining these devices, it is important to posit the
situations in which the "specter" of multiple liability can occur. For
purposes of this analysis we will assume, as the dissent urged, that:
(1) indirect consumers are able to prove passing-on and thus can
sue a manufacturer for injury that resulted thereby; and (2) the
assertion of the passing-on defense is limited to defensive situations in which both direct and indirect purchasers are joined together in the same suit against the manufacturer.9 8
The risk of multiple liability99 is predicated on the assumption
that an antitrust defendant, if not permitted to defend by showing
93. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2] Trade Cases 74,680, at
94,982 (D. Conn. 1973). The court viewed the issue as one dealing purely with problems of proving and apportioning damages and not as an issue of standing.
94. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2079 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2] Trade Cases $ 74,680,
at 94,978-79 (D. Conn. 1973)).
95. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2079 (1977).
96. See, e.g., Comment, 123 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 30, at 994.
97. See, e.g., In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2] Trade Cases 74,680,
at 94,977 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 274 F. Supp. 961, 965 (W.D.
Wash. 1967).
98. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2079 (1977).
99. For cases in which courts have recognized the possibility of duplicative
recoveries, see Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 308 F. Supp. 963, 965 (D.
Minn. 1970); Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 951
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 71
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied, 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964).
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passing-on by the direct purchaser, would be sued in two distinct
treble-damage suits arising from the same violation of the antitrust
laws: first, by the direct purchaser, and second, by the indirect
purchaser.1 0 0 Moreover, the specter of multiple liability for the defendants, according to the Supreme Court, is even further enhanced by a one-sided "presumption": 0 1 "that one plaintiff (the
direct purchaser) is entitled to full recovery while preventing the
defendant from using that presumption against the other plaintiff."'

0 2

The majority hypothesized a situation in which a direct purchaser sued an antitrust defendant manufacturer and recovered
treble-damages. Thereafter, within the four-year statute of limitations,' 0 3 an indirect purchaser also sued the manufacturer and also
recovered treble-damages. In this instance, the majority argued,
the defendant would be exposed to sixfold liability. For each additional plaintiff, the defendant's liability could potentially be increased threefold. However, as previously asserted, many direct
purchasers are reluctant to sue their suppliers.' 0 4 Moreover, if
such reluctance does not exist, there are still various procedural0 5devices that can reduce the possibility of duplicative recoveries.'
The potential for duplicative recoveries only exists when direct
and indirect purchasers are suing separately in two distinct
actions.' 0 6 But if both plaintiffs, direct and indirect purchasers, are
joined in one suit, the possibility of multiple liability for the defen100. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2067 (1977).
101. See McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. PITT. L. REv. 177,

188-89 (1971). In Hanover Shoe the Court conclusively presumed from the fact of the
overcharge that the direct purchaser was injured in the full amount of the overcharge.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). However,
Professor McGuire argues that "a conclusive presumption will not be established
unless it is nearly certain that the assumed fact follows from the proven fact. In the
context of passing-on, there is no certainty that the buyer will be damaged in the
amount of the overcharge." McGuire, supra at 188-89 (footnote omitted).
102. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2067 (1977).
103. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
104. See text accompanying note 45 supra. See also In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
105. The Supreme Court has recognized the argument that "it is better for the
defendant to pay six-fold or more damages than for an injured party to go uncompensated." Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2067 n.l (1977) (citing Comment, 72 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 10, at 411).
106. Cf. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2067 & n.11 (1977) (unequal
application of Hanover Shoe rule increases risk of duplicative recoveries even more
substantially than if defendant is sued in two different lawsuits).
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dant is greatly diminished.10 7 Moreover, it has been suggested that
once all parties to an antitrust action are joined in one suit, the
defendant manufacturer need only litigate the liability issue, because once a violation has been established, the issue of damages
and the possibility of a pass-on need only be litigated between the
various consumers of the product.' 0 8 Bifurcated trials 0 9 of this
type, and of the more traditional type in which liability and damages are litigated by the same parties but at distinct trials, have
been used with great success in antitrust and nonantitrust litigation.1 10
Some of the devices that have been suggested to hedge against
multiple liability by the institution of one lawsuit in which all parties
are joined are: (1) intervention;"' (2) statutory interpleader;" i 2 (3)
collateral estoppel;" i 3 (4) consolidation;" 4 (5) multidistrict transfer
provisions;"15 and (6) the short four-year statute of limitations.1 1 6
Even assuming that the parties cannot avail themselves of any of
these devices, one commentator has suggested that a theory akin to
the one for the imposition of an "equitable lien""i 7 or a "constructive trust,' 118 or a requirement that the litigating plaintiff post a
bond in the amount of the judgment," i 9 would allow either the
direct or indirect purchaser to sue without joining the other party.
107.

One commentator has argued that by utilizing an "apportionment-type"

approach in which direct and indirect purchasers are party plaintiffs in one suit
against the manufacturer, the possibility of multiple liability is not only diminished
but is actually reduced to the point where it "presents no risk" of multiple liability.
McGuire, supra note 101, at 194-97.
108. Id. at 194.
109. Bifurcated trials are also known as split trials. See Green v. Wolf, 406 F.2d
291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
110. See In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F.2d 5, 12 n.11 (2d Cir.
1975) (antitrust suit); Green v. Wolf, 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 977 (1969) (securities suit).
111. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
113. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 329-30 (1971). See also In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2]
Trade Cases 74,680, at 94,977-79 (D. Conn. 1973).
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1970).
117. McGuire, supra note 101, at 198.
118. Id. "A constructive trust arises when a person who holds title to property
is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would
be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it." Id. (quoting 5 A. ScoTT, LAW
OF TRUSTS § 462 (3d ed. 1967)).

119. Id. at 199.
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In the event of recovery against the defendant antitrust violator,
the successful plaintiff would hold the amount recovered in escrow
until the statute of limitations had run. In this way, the party not
joined in the suit could be assured that the successful party will
not be judgment proof in the event of a subsequent suit. 120 Admit-

tedly, these devices are not perfect; 121 however, their application
would be a positive attempt to further the " 'result orientation'
trend in which the Court has approached the whole area of private
treble-damage litigation.'

1 22

Complex Litigation Revisited
The Court conceded that the multiple liability potential may
be dealt with by using the devices noted above. 1 23 However, Mr.
Justice White, as he had done in Hanover Shoe, asserted that the
effective enforcement of the antitrust laws will not be furthered by
permitting the offensive use of passing-on because the judicial system would be overburdened. In the Court's words:
The Court's concern in Hanover Shoe to avoid weighing down
treble-damage actions with the 'massive evidence and complicated theories' . . . involved in attempting to establish a pass-on

defense against a direct purchaser applies a fortiori to the attempt to trace the effect of the overcharge through each step in
the distribution chain from the direct purchaser to the ultimate
consumer. We are no more inclined than we were in Hanover
120. See id.
121. For example, to invoke the collateral estoppel doctrine, both purchasers
must be parties in the initial suit because anyone not a party to that suit could not be
bound by the first court's judgment in a subsequent suit. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc.
v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
122. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
123. The procedural devices that the Court mentions are: Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970), and Federal Statutory Interpleader, 28 U.S.C. 1335
(1970). Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2067 n.11 (1977). The Court
asserted that "[t]hese procedural devices cannot protect against multiple liability
where the direct purchasers have already recovered by obtaining a judgment or by
settling, as is more likely (and as occurred here . . .)." Id. (citation omitted). However, this occurrence would be the optimal situation to utilize the "constructive
trust" theory with the escrow provision. See text accompanying notes 118-120 supra.
Additionally, it should be remembered that when defendants settled their claims
with all parties other than Illinois, it was stipulated that the settlement was without
prejudice to the claims of Illinois. See note 70 supra. Therefore, although the risk of
multiple liability was still present, the defendants could have protected themselves
by stipulating that in the event the indirect purchasers recovered, their recovery
would be apportioned from the settlement fund.
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Shoe to ignore the burdens that such an attempt would impose
24
on the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.'
Although the litigation of the direct purchaser's injury may be
1 25
more complex than the indirect purchaser's injury in one respect,
and while economic and statistical theories have facilitated the
proof of injury, 126 there is still little doubt that antitrust trials will
continue to present complex evidentiary issues. However, the
mere possibility of judicially burdensome trials cannot, on balance,
outweigh the importance of the private antitrust treble-damage
remedy. 12 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court has reiterated on numerous occasions that "[the constant tendency of the courts is to find
some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has
been done. Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused with
128
right of recovery."'
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co. 1 29 is an example of an
antitrust suit which, upon first analysis, a court might be prompted
to dismiss for putatively insurmountable proof problems which
would greatly burden the judicial process. However, all claims between wholesalers, retailers, and consumers were settled' 30 and the
compromise settlement was affirmed. 13 ' This case thus indicates
124. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2072 (1977).
125. The majority noted that in the defensive passing-on case, even if the defendant could prove that the direct purchaser had passed-on the full amount of the
overcharge, it was still possible that the direct purchaser was injured within the
terms of § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), because of a reduction in its
volume of sales caused by its increased price which was necessitated by the overcharge. The Court stated in this regard: "This additional element of injury from reduced volume is not present in the suit by the final purchaser of the overcharged
goods, where the issue regarding injury will be whether the defendant's overcharge
caused the plaintiff to pay a higher price for whatever it purchased." Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2068 n.13 (1977). However, the majority noted that on
balance, the indirect purchaser's burden is still greater than the direct purchaser's
burden, even given the simplicity created by obviating the litigation of the reduced
volume issue. Id.
126. See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
128. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946) (quoting
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1931)).
See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359,
379 (1927); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 152-53 (1973) (discussing Supreme Court's general practice of relaxing plaintiff's standard of proof in antitrust litigation to promote strong public policy of deterring antitrust violators).
129. 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
130. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
131. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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that an absolute presumption that passing-on "would add whole
new dimensions of complexity to treble-damage suits and seriously
undermine their effectiveness" 132 is unjustified and should not be
the basis for preclusion of the action.
Chas. Pfizer involved sixty-six civil actions, twenty-six of which
were commenced in the southern district of New York and forty
of which were transferred to that district by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation "for coordinated or consolidated pre-trial
proceedings.' 1 33 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 13 4 in the sale of antibiotics.
Plaintiffs thus sought treble-damages under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. 1 35 In addition to the private civil actions filed, charges
were also lodged against defendants by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).' 36 A Senate subcommittee also investigated question13 7
able industry practices which included defendants' activities.
Evidence was taken before a FTC Hearing Examiner for approximately one month. 138 The FTC ordered the defendants to "cease
and desist" from any and all forms of price-fixing.139 Upon a second
review by the Second Circuit after an initial review and a remand,
the Commission's order was affirmed. 140 Prior to the filing of the
132. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2070 (1977).
133. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 712 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
135. Id. § 15.
136. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was created in 1914 to prevent unfair methods of competition. The FTC has the power to issue "cease and desist"
orders to the offending party. After these orders become final, the FTC may levy a
maximum penalty of $5000 for each violation of the FTC order. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58
(1970). See also 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 311, 312 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, 15 ST.

Louis U.L.J.].
137. In 1959 and 1960, Senator Kefauver, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, investigated the
ethical practice of the drug industry. The public hearings are contained in S. REP.
No. 448, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F.
Supp. 710, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
871 (1971).
138. There was testimony by witnesses which spanned a period of 86 days.
The Commission called 13 witnesses; the defendants called 45 witnesses; and three
witnesses were considered as called by the hearing examiner. The testimony ran to
9000 pages in the stenographic transcript. The documentary exhibits were massive in
number and extent; they occupy at least 12 printed volumes and consist of 8000
pages. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 715 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
139. Id. at 716.
140. Defendants sought review of the FTC's order pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(c) (1970). See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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civil actions, defendants were indicted, charged with three counts
of conspiracy in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The jury found defendants guilty on all three counts.
These convictions, however, were reversed upon appeal for errors
14 1
in the judge's charge to the jury.
It would be difficult to find a more complicated and judicially
burdensome litigation than the Chas. Pfizer litigation. However,
despite the vast number of actions 14 2 and the numerous parties
therein, the district court refused to dismiss this judicially-taxing
litigation. Indeed, the court in its discretion maintained tight control over the class action to the end that the proposed compromise
settlement was approved and affirmed by the Second Circuit. The
empirical evidence provided by the Chas. Pfizer suits militates
against an assumption that allowing all parties injured by an overcharge to join in one suit overburdens the judicial system and
seriously undermines the effectiveness of the private antitrust remedy. As one court has observed: "It has never been thought that
an antitrust violation is irremediable because done on a grand
scale." 1 43 The decision in Illinois Brick would deprive indirect purchasers of their remedy solely because of the "grand scale" of the
antitrust violation.
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT:

THE

EFFICACY OF CONSUMER SUITS

Problems Inherent in Class Actions
The legislative history of the original Sherman Antitrust
Act, 14 4 particularly that provision which eventually became a part
of the Clayton Act and which deals with the private treble-damage
remedy, 14 5 demonstrates that the Sherman Antitrust Act was in146
tended to provide a remedy to the party ultimately damaged.
141. United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1970).
142. Actions were commenced not only by states, but by Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, numerous cities, and many townships. Many of these governmental entities were intervenor plaintiffs in actions that had already been instituted by

other parties.
143. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 196 n.5 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
144. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)).
145. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1970)).
146. See Note, The Defense of "Passing-On" in Treble Damage Suits Under the
Antitrust Laws, 70 YALE L.J. 469, 477 nn.58 & 59 (citing 21 CONG. REC. 1767 (1890)
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The intentions of the Congressmen who promulgated that legislation, however, have never been truly realized.' 47 Most antitrust
suits involving consumer injury result in nominal harm to many
individuals. 148 As a result, consumers seldom sue. In fact, consumers have fared so poorly under the antitrust laws that Representative Peter Rodino of New Jersey 149 has remarked that "an individual suit by an injured consumer is, as a practical matter, out of
1 50
the question."'
The maxim that "there is strength in numbers" is applicable to
the class action device. But equally applicable is the notion that
"too much of a good thing" is undesirable. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23151 and the case law that has interpreted the rule
have used both of these notions. Section (a) requires four prerequisites for a member to sue or be sued as a representative party on
behalf of the class: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable; (2) there must be questions of law
or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties must be able fairly and adequately to protect the interests of the class. 152 In addition, the
action must fall into one of the subsections of section (b) entitled
"Class Actions Maintainable.' 1 53 The primary requirement of section (b) is subsection (3): "the court finds that the questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members and that a class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.' 1 54 As to the first part of subsection
(remarks of Senator George regarding § 7 of Senator Sherman's original bill creating
private remedy)); 21 CONG. REc.2615 (1890) (remarks of Senator Coke). Cf. Note, 15
ST. LouIs U.L.J., supra note 136, at 313 (congressional debate during passage of
Sherman Antitrust Act evidenced suspicion for effectiveness of private action).
147. The expense to an individual consumer only nominally injured of bringing
an antitrust suit is much greater than any damages he could possibly recover. See
Note, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J., supra note 136, at 312-13; Comment, 43 S.CAL. L. REV.
supra note 1, at 572.
148.

Comment, 43 S. CAL. L. REV., supra note 1, at 570-71.

149. Chairman, Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, Committee on the Judiciary.
150. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2575.

151. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (as amended 1966).
152. Id. 23(a).
153. Id.23(b)(1)-(3).
154.

Id. 23(b)(3). See generally Comment, 43 S. CAL. L. REv., supra note 1,

at 580.
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(3), the test that the courts have applied is not as strict as the
actual language of the subsection might require. Generally, the
55
courts have been satisfied with a showing of "common question.'
The second part of the subsection is also not a difficult requirement
for the prospective consumer to meet, because often a class action
is the only realistic method of bringing the suit.
The problem created by amended rule 23, especially for consumer suits, is the hurdle imposed by the notice requirement of
section (c)(2). 156 Even if the representative of the class could bear
the initial burden of the action, 157 the suit might still be dismissed
by the trial court because of insurmountable problems of "manageability in the conduct of the litigation.' 158 Moreover, even if
the class is certified by the court 5 9 and an injury and damages are
proven, problems of distribution of the damages are also a ground
upon which a court may dismiss the suit as inherently unmanageable or impractical. 160 Given the constraints imposed by rule 23,
155.

See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 566-67

(10th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 41 F.R.D. 518, 519 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
156. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), in
which the district court, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), dismissed the action because plaintiff
representative of the class could not bear the financial burdern of approximately
$400,000 which was the cost of proper notice to the 6,000,000 plaintiffs in the class.
The Second Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). Upon remand, the district court held that the
action was maintainable as a class action and required defendants to bear 90% of the
cost of giving notice to the class members. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D.
565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Upon appeal, the Second Circuit held that the action was not maintainable as a class
action because the "costs of administration of the action would exceed the amount
due to the few members of the class who filed claims and the individual members of
the class would get nothing." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d
Cir. 1973).
157. Compare Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d Cir. 1968)
with Contract Buyers League v. F&F Inv. 48 F.R.D. 7, 12-13 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
158. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1975), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2576 (citing cases n.6).
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) (as amended 1966).
160. See, e.g., Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 600-02 (N.D. Ill.
1973); Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 73 (D.N.J. 1971). Some courts
have argued for a "fluid recovery" approach in which the class would recover the
total damage to the class. If individual members of the class do not file enough
claims against the fund to deplete it entirely, the excess is distributed to some "fluid
class," for example, future purchasers of a product from defendants. For a court that
rejected this "fluid class" notion, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005,
1018 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Wheeler, supra note 38, at 1341. See also
Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 203-04 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 913 (1963).
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and given the additional problem of consumers' lack of time, interest, or knowledge of a violation so that they can sue a manufacturer who has illegally fixed his price, it is not surprising that one
commentator has noted: "Very briefly, a class action approach to
16 1
protect the public seems inadequate and unrealistic.Parens Patriae Suits
Parens patriae suits are derivatives of the rule 23 action. The
court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,1 6 2 where a class action was
employed, stated:
From our extensive study of the whole situation in working on
this Eisen case it would seem that amended Rule 23 provides
an excellent and workable procedure in cases where the number of members of the class is not too large. It seems doubtful
that further amendments to Rule 23 can be expected to be effective %vherethere are millions of members of the class, without
some infringement of constitutional requirements. The problem
is really one for solution by the Congress. Numerous administrative agencies protect consumers in various ways. It should, we
think, be possible for the Congress to create some public body
to do justice in the matter of consumers' claims in such fashion
as to afford compensation to the injured consumer. If penalties
are to be imposed upon wrongdoers, at least let the Congress
decide how the money is to be spent.' 6 3
A similar judicial invitation was extended to Congress in California
v. Frito-Lay, Inc. ;1 4 as a result, Congress enacted the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.165
The concept of parens patriae, literally "father of his country,"
is rooted in English common law.' 6 6 Borrowing this notion, Congress has created an effective mechanism which permits "a State
attorney general to bring parens patriae actions for treble damages
'on behalf of natural persons residing in such State injured by any
violation of the antitrust laws.' -167 In so providing, Congress over161. Note, 15 ST. LOUIS U.L.J., supra note 136, at 313.
162. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
163. Id. at 1019. Amended rule 23 utilizes the "best notice practicable" test.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (as amended 1966).
164. 474 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
165. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)).
166. The concept originally referred to the power of the state over infants, incompetents, and charities. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIES* 426-27, quoted in
Note, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J., supra note 136, at 321.
167. H.R REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2578. The House report referred to the provision for
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ruled the Supreme Court's earlier holding in Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co. ,168 which prevented a state from recovering for injury to
its general economy for violations of the Clayton Act. 16 9
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 is
designed to protect the constitutional due process rights of litigants, while at the same time avoiding the notice requirements of
rule 23. The legislation adopts the "all that is practicable under the
circumstances test" of amended rule 23.170 However, Congress has
taken an additional step by recognizing that circumstances vary;
therefore, the court is empowered to determine what constitutes
proper notice under the circumstances. 17 1 The new Act also deals
with the problems inherent in the distribution 172 and computation of damages, 1 73 for it sanctions fluid recoveries and aggregation
of damages. Additionally, the new Act protects the res judicata
rights of potential defendants, thus ensuring that antitrust defendants are not exposed to multiple liability. 174 Finally, the Act seeks
to promote federal-state cooperation and coordination of antitrust
75
enforcement.1
Thus, Congress has created a device by which injured consumers, previously without a practical remedy for an antitrust violation, can now prevent antitrust violators from retaining the fruits

of their illegality through the vehicle of the state attorney general.
The Act deals effectively with the problems inherent in the rule
such a parens patriae suit, Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4C(a), 90 Stat. 1383 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)), as the
"heart of H.R. 8532." H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2578.
168. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
169. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2080 (1977).
170. Amended rule 23(c) provides in part: "The court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." FED.
R. Civ. P. 23 (as amended 1966).
171. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1975), reprintedin [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2581.

172. See note 160 supra and accompanying text. The Act allows for "fluid recoveries" of damages which was rejected in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d
1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Handler & Blechman, supra note 54, at 633.
173. See text accompanying notes 28-38 supra. The Act allows for the aggregation of damages and thus obviates the necessity of individual proof of damages. It
also provides that reasonable estimates of damages are sufficient. Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4D, 90 Stat. 1383 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)).
174. See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra.
175. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1975), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2587.
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23 class action and mitigates to a large degree the possibility of multiple liability. 176 Most importantly, however, it enhances the effectiveness of the private treble-damage action for enforcing the antiadvocacy of the
trust laws. In sum, the Act supported the dissent's
17 7
doctrine.
passing-on
the
of
application"
"unequal
CONCLUSION

The majority and the dissent in Illinois Brick concurred on
the essential point that "[t]he purposes of the antitrust laws are
best served by insuring that the private action will be an everpresent threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in
violation of the antitrust laws." 178 Despite this belief, the majority
allowed considerations of stare decisis to hamper its view unduly.
The unfortunate result is that those who bear the burden of an illegal overcharge have no remedy, while those who are uninjured
may receive a windfall profit. This result is repugnant to notions of
equity and justice; more importantly, it cannot be reconciled with
the dual purposes-compensation and deterrence-of the antitrust
laws. The Court in Illinois Brick has established that the phrase
"any person who shall be injured" of section 4 of the Clayton Act
includes, as a matter of law, only direct purchasers.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, articulated the illogic of the
majority's reasoning:
I think the plaintiffs-respondents in this case [Illinois], which
they now have lost, are the victims of an unhappy chronology. If
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S.
481 (1968) had not preceded this case, and were it not "on the
176. But see Handler & Blechman, supra note 54, at 648. These commentators
argue that the underlying assumption upon which the parens patriae legislation is
based, that consumers have viable treble-damage claims, is erroneous. This thesis is
based on the assertion that the amount of damage to consumers is usually quite small
in comparison to the problems of proof. Moreover, these commentators suggest that
the danger of parens patriae suits and fluid recoveries is that many defendants are
not large corporations but are individual businessmen and practitioners who may
lose their livelihoods because of these suits. Id. at 661. Whether the activities of
these defendants are grossly illegal or marginally illegal is not the issue. If a balancing test is to be used, equity mandates that the innocent consumer should prevail
even if it means "economic extinction" for some of the marginally illegal antitrust
defendants. The interests of innocent consumers and the policy to be served by effective enforcement of the antitrust laws should take precedence over the interests of
any antitrust defendants.
177. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2080-81 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
178. Id. at 2080 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Co., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)).
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books," I am positive that the Court today would be affirming,
perhaps unanimously, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
[reversing the district court and allowing indirect consumers to
prove their damages.] The policy behind the Antitrust Acts and
all the signs point in that direction, and a conclusion in favor of
indirect purchasers who could demonstrate injury would almost
be compelled.
But Hanover Shoe is on the books, and the Court feels that
it must be "consistent" in its application of pass-on. That, for
me, is a wooden approach, and it is entirely inadequate when
considered in the light of the objectives of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976 tells us all that is needed as to Congress' present
understanding of the Acts. Nevertheless, we must now await still
179
another statute which . . the Congress may adopt.
The policies that prompted the Court in Hanover Shoe to reject defensive passing-on should not control in Illinois Brick because the interests at stake are different in offensive passing-on
situations. In Hanover Shoe the Court was concerned that defendant would escape liability if a passing-on defense were permitted;
however, escape from liability was not a viable possibility in Illinois
Brick. Therefore the dissent's approach of limiting the defensive
use of passing-on to Hanover Shoe-like situations, instead of taking
the illogical leap of barring all use of passing-on, is the preferable
approach. Finally, the Court's sidestepping of the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, especially in light of
congressional intent behind this legislation, was inconsistent because the Court was concerned with judicial economy. As Mr. Justice Blackmun admonished: "One regrets that it takes so long and
so much repetitious effort to achieve, and have this Court recognize, the obvious congressional aim."'1 0
Neal Steven Schelberg
179. Id. at 2085 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
180. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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